Abstract. In this paper, we consider an N -player interacting strategic game in the presence of a (endogenous) dominating player, who gives direct influence on individual agents, through its impact on their control in the sense of Stackelberg game, and then on the whole community. Each individual agent is subject to a delay effect on collecting information, specifically at a delay time, from the dominating player. The size of his delay is completely known by the agent, while to others, including the dominating player, his delay plays as a hidden random variable coming from a common fixed distribution. By invoking a noncanonical fixed point property, we show that for a general class of finite N -player games, each of them converges to the mean field counterpart which may possess an optimal solution that can serve as an -Nash equilibrium for the corresponding finite N -player game. Second, we provide, with explicit solutions, a comprehensive study on the corresponding linear quadratic mean field games of small agents with delay from a dominating player. Given the information flow obtained from both the dominating player and the whole community via the mean field term, the filtration to which the control of the representative agent adapted is non-Brownian. Therefore, we propose to utilize backward stochastic dynamics (instead of the common approach through backward stochastic differential equations) for the construction of adjoint process for the resolution of his optimal control. A simple sufficient condition for the unique existence of mean field equilibrium is provided by tackling a class of nonsymmetric Riccati equations. Finally, via a study of a class of forward-backward stochastic functional differential equations, the optimal control of the dominating player is granted given the unique existence of the mentioned mean field equilibrium for small players.
Introduction. Heinrich von Stackelberg
introduced a hierarchical solution for markets with leader and followers in 1934, which is now known as the Stackelberg equilibrium. In the context of a two-person nonzero-sum game, a follower would pick an optimal strategy based on the policies approved by the leader, who may anticipate the follower's rational reaction and announce the policies that optimize his performance index. The notion of the Stackelberg solution was later extended to a multiperiod setting; see Simaan and Cruz [22] . For the continuous time version, one may find Başar, Bensoussan, and Sethi [1] and Bensoussan, Chen, and Sethi [4] and the references therein. In practice, due to the heterogeneous technological advance of different agents and the presence of transaction costs, it is natural to assume that individuals have no choice but to respond slowly (with various magnitudes) to policy changes. Individuals can also gather information through the interactions with the community. This raises the importance in studying Stackelberg games which consist of many followers that receive information from the leader with various magnitudes of delay. To make it consistent with the general context of mean field games, "agents" (resp., "dominating player") would be regarded as synonymous with "followers" (resp., "leader") in this article.
On the other hand, providing a tractable analysis of interactive strategic behavior of a group of agents is normally challenging. One of the most popular modeling frameworks is through the use of stochastic differential games (SDGs) to mimic the evolutionary dynamics of interacting agents, each of whom aims to optimize his own objective functional. For example, Elliott [12] examined the relationship between the existence of the values of the zero-sum SDGs with two players. Bensoussan and Frehse [5, 6] use the dynamic programming approach to solve the nonzero-sum SDGs with N players over an infinite time horizon. In general, the nonzero-sum game problem is getting harder to tackle with the number of agents; in contrast, the problem becomes much more computable for infinitely many players due to the corresponding Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker-Planck (HJB-FP) systems. This approach was founded by Huang, Caines, and Malhamé [13, 14] , who investigated SDG problems in an infinitely many players setting; independently, Lasry and Lions [16, 17, 18] studied similar problems from the viewpoint of mean field theory originating from physics, and they coined the novel study as mean field games (MFGs). Under the mean field framework, instead of highlighting the interaction between any two agents explicitly, each individual now interacts with a common medium created in the community, precisely, the mean field term; mathematically, this mean field term converges to a functional of the probability distribution of the whole population as the number of agents N goes to infinity.
In the contemporary MFG problems, agents are assumed to have homogeneous objectives and state dynamics, yet with independently and identically distributed noises. Each agent makes a decision purely based on his own state and the mean field term from the community; in particular, in explaining its own interaction with the community, each individual considers the mean field term as exogenous. That is to say, each individual's decision has negligible effect on the whole community-the mean field term. Thus, without loss of generality, we can just focus on one agent in an MFG and call him the representative agent. Mathematically, given the mean field term (as a functional of probability measure), one first solves the optimal control problem for the representative agent. By equating the given mean field term with the functional of the probability measure of all the agents caused by their optimal trajectories, i.e., the corresponding fixed point, we obtain the desired mean field term; this constitutes an equilibrium for the mean field problem and serves as an -Nash equilibrium for the finite-player counterparts. In general, the common MFG possesses the following forward-backward structure: (1) a forward dynamic describes the individual strategic behavior; (2) a backward equation describes the evolution of individual optimal strategy. For the details of the derivation of this system of equations with a forward-backward feature, consult the works of Huang, Caines, and Malhamé [13, 14] , Lasry and Lions [16, 17, 18] , Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam [3] , Bensoussan, Frehse, and Yam [8] , and Bensoussan et al. [9] .
With no doubt, one can easily imagine several dimensions on generalizing the first batch of MFG results such as those mentioned above. For example, it is interesting to study the problems with agents coming from heterogeneous sources; see [8] . Besides, Huang [15] also investigated linear quadratic MFGs that consist of a significantly "big" (major) player and a huge number of "small" (minor) players, in which they considered the mean field term as exogenous to the major player. Nourian and Caines [20] consider a similar problem under a generalized setting again with an exogenous mean field term. To be precise, given the mean field term, they first solve the optimal control problem for the major player. Then they proceed to solve for the optimal control for the minor player. Under their proposed framework, the decision of the major player cannot impose his immediate influence right away on the mean field term, and this limitation restricts its scope of applications in economics and finance, as it is easily perceived that most governors have certain power (even though are not almighty) on overriding and guiding the future route of the whole community. Motivated by the latter consideration, we propose a substantially different general framework in [3] , the MFGs in the presence of a "dominating player" (we rephrase it as "dominating" in order to emphasize our distinction from all previous works in the literature, such as that in [15] and [20] ). Compared with the community of small agents in the MFG, the nature of the dominating role of the "big" player is clear in the sense that changes in the behavior of this dominating player would immediately and directly affect both the perception of all individual agents and the aggregated (coalesced) public information through the evolution of the mean field term. More precisely, both the optimal controls of the small agents and the mean field term are functionals of the optimal dynamics of the dominating player; see Lemma 3.4 and (3.9), respectively. In this regard, in [3] , the mean field term is endogenous in the control problem for the dominating player. That is, given the mean field term and the policies set by the dominating player, we first solve the optimal control for the representative agent. Regarding the aggregated (optimized) mean field term as a functional of the dominating player, we next proceed to solve for the dominator's optimal control. The functional form of the optimal control of the representative agent is adapted to the filtration influenced by the dominating player. Our setting agrees with the philosophy of Stackelberg games, in which the dominating player has to anticipate representative agents' rational reaction before making his own optimal policy.
In this paper, we make a noticeable step forward by fundamentally generalizing the dominating small players setting in [3] . In the presence of a dominating player, we assume that there is a technological limitation to each agent so that he can only grasp the information coming from the dominating player at a delayed time. In the literature for common delay problems in stochastic controls or MFGs, they usually refer to the delay in the states or controls for agents, which are clearly adapted to Brownian-type filtrations, at most, up to a delay. In our problem formulation, the delay information is generated by a third party, that is, the dominating player. Each agent then solves his own optimal control problem based on three sources of information flows, namely, (1) agent's own noise; (2) delayed information coming from the dominating player; (3) the aggregated (coalesced) public information via the mean field term.
The filtration generated by the third source through the mean field term carries extra information over the first and the second source as other agents with smaller size of delay would also contribute to the aggregated (coalesced) information, that is, the mean field term. And it is clear that this new information flow to each agent would be neither Brownian nor a postponed filtration (up to a time lag); this kind of context normally happens in the rate-dependent hysteresis phenomena in economics and finance. To one specific agent, he understands his own constraints and therefore has full knowledge of his own delay time; on the other hand, the same agent will try his best to hide this information from others, just like as happened in adverse selection markets (or principal-agent models). In principle, it is natural to assume that this private information of the exact delay time of any single agent would be a hidden random variable Δ to all other parties including the dominating player, and this Δ can also be interpreted as the distance of a random agent from the dominating player; we further assume that these hidden random variables originating from all other players follow a common distribution π Δ independently. And the knowledge of the exact form of π Δ is supposed to be known by the dominating player and all small agents from day one on.
In the present article, in section 2, we consider an N -player game, in the presence of a dominating player. Each individual agent collects information from the dominating player. To the same agent, the magnitude of such delay is completely known, while to all other agents and the dominating player, this delay time is a hidden random variable following a fixed distribution π Δ . It is noted that in the present setting, each agent solves his own optimal control problem based on the mentioned three sources of information flows, which altogether should result in a non-Brownian filtration that makes the common application of the standard maximum principle via the celebrated martingale representation theorem not quite immediate. We establish the convergence of the empirical system (one over the finite number of players) to the mean field analogical one, under a noncanonical fixed point property which is rare even in the traditional stochastic control theory, indeed. Furthermore, unlike the common considerations in the existing literature, we can only conclude that this convergence is only a topological one instead of one with convergence rate of order 1/ √ N . We also show that the mentioned novel fixed point property ensures a -Nash equilibrium for the similar game with finitely many agents. In section 3, we explicitly solve this new MFG under the linear quadratic setting. By first regarding both the mean field term and the dominating player's influence as exogenous, we solve the control problem for the representative agent which yields the stochastic version of a coupled HJB-FP equation. Since the control for each agent is now adapted to a non-Brownian filtration, we utilize the lately developed technology, called backward stochastic dynamics (see Liang, Lions, and Qian [19] ), to tackle the construction issue on the underlying adjoint process, which is now satisfying a backward (stochastic) equation on a preassigned filtration. The ultimate importance and necessity of the use of backward stochastic dynamics is that it overcomes the shortcoming of the reliance of the traditional martingale representation theorem on the Brownian filtration for the construction of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) satisfied by the usual adjoint processes. After the establishment of the optimal control of each agent, we apply the mentioned fixed point property in section 2 to obtain the equilibrium trajectory of the desired mean field term. We then proceed to resolve the corresponding optimal control problem for the dominating player, now by regarding the mean field term as endogenous, again via the stochastic maximum principle. By constructing an appropriate linear functional, we show that the optimal solution for the dominating player has to correspond to the solution of a particular system of forward-backward stochastic functional differential equations (FBSFDEs). Finally, a simple sufficient condition on guaranteeing the unique existence of the solution for this FBSFDE, and hence the original MFG problem, will be further discussed in section 4.
2. -Nash equilibrium. Consider an N -player game and let (Ω, F , P) be a complete probability space. For a fixed T > 0, let W 0 and W 
From the ith player's perspective, {Δ j } j∈{1,...,i−1,i+1,...,N } is a sequence of identically and independently distributed random variables on R, where Δ j represents the delay parameter for the jth player. One may naturally assume that each participant together with the dominating player has the knowledge of the prior probability measure of Δ, which is denoted by π Δ . Each ith player, however, only knows the magnitude of his own delay, not that of the others. Equivalently, each player's delay is private information (hidden variable) to others, which resembles an adverse selection market. In particular, we set Δ ∈ [a, b], where 0 ≤ a ≤ b are some fixed finite positive numbers.
Define the following filtrations:
To the ith player, all others' delay times are hidden random variables. Without loss of generality, we just focus on the ith player, with his delay
). The objective for the ith player is to minimize the cost functional:
Since the ith player interacts with the population through the term
Here z is an appropriate process to be introduced later. In analogy, the cost functional for the ith player is given by
As shown later in this section, we can choose z to be a process adapted to F 
adapted. In principle, the functional form of the optimal control of the representative agent is adapted to F 0 t−δ ∨ F z t , which is under the direct influence of the dominating player, and hence within the spirit of Stackelberg games setting.
The mean field analogy system (2.5) and (2.6) is less complex than the empirical system (2.2) and (2.4) in the sense that 1. in the mean field analogy system, for any fixed
2. the mean field analogy evolution of the dominating player, x 0 , is free from each individuals' x i, Δi 1 , while the empirical evolution, y 0 , requires individual states through the term
Since the interacting term is now replaced by z, the equilibrium could be attained as shown in the following. We work on the spaces for the states and controls
with similar norms
where each integration takes over the respective appropriate domain of definition.
We impose some standard assumptions on the coefficient functions in the SDEs. For
, we assume the following:
A.1. Lipschitz continuity. g 0 and g 1 are globally Lipschitz continuous in all arguments, i.e., there exists L > 0, such that
A.2. Linear growth. g 0 and g 1 are of linear growth in all arguments, i.e., there exists L > 0, such that
A.3. Quadratic condition (see (A.5) in Carmona and Delarue [10] ). There exists L > 0 such that by showing a stronger result that
In the following, K(c) denotes a constant only depending on c (but not N ), which may vary from line to line. First, we observe that for any t ≤ T ,
For the third term, observe that
where the equality results from symmetry as each player adopts the corresponding optimal controls. Similar inequality could be obtained for the forth term. Hence, using the Gronwall's inequality, (2.8) becomes
The first term clearly vanishes as N → +∞. By putting t = T , whether (2.9) converges to zero would only depend on
We now proceed to establish this fact step by step as follows.
Constant Δ.
We first consider the simplest case that Δ = δ = a = b, i.e., the amplitude of delay is homogeneous among all players. Under our problem formulation, since
If the mean field term is chosen to satisfy the fixed point
, the cross terms vanish. Hence by symmetric consideration on {x
Discrete Δ.
We next consider Δ to be discretely distributed with 
where
. . , M n ) to be the multinomial random variable so that M k counts the number of players in the kth hysteresis group. Given M , by permutation symmetry, we can re-index the players without altering the conditional expectation. Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume the first M 0 players have Δ = a 0 . Then, the next M 1 players have Δ = a 1 and so on. Thus,
To show the convergence as
Observe that given
(s), together with the derivation as in (2.10) in section 2.1.1, we have (2.12)
which goes to 0 as N → ∞. On the other hand, the second term
clearly vanishes as N → ∞.
Continuum Δ.
In this subsection, we consider Δ being distributed on [a, b] with an absolutely continuous measure π Δ . We make some additional assumptions on the optimal control A.4. Continuity on optimal controls. There exists
is Lipschitz continuous, i.e.,
A.5. Boundedness on optimal controls. There exists C > 0 such that
This condition could be verified for the optimal solution to be obtained in the rest of this paper. Using the ideas in Lemma 2.1, we first assume the mean field term satisfies the fixed point property (2.14)
To validate the limiting argument in this section, we make two claims in which we omit the proofs here, as they are pretty standard.
C.1. Boundedness.
where K is a constant depending on T, L, C, σ 0 , σ 1 , u 0 , and sup δ u i,δ 1 . Theorem 2.2. Suppose that z satisfies (2.14). Then we have
Proof. Let {a
n ) be the multinomial random variable on {a
Hence we have (2.17)
Here we set z
where the last equality holds due to the symmetry of {x j,(Δj)
(s)} j within each hysteresis group. Using the Lipschitz property (2.16), we have (2.18)
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Using the bound given by (2.15), we have
For the third term in (2.17), observe that
For the first term on the right-hand side of (2.20) , by the Lipschitz property (2.16),
For the second term on the right-hand side of (2.20), for any fixed s and δ, there exists a sequence of (n, k; k ≤ n) such that a (n) k → δ; by applying the martingale convergence theorem,
Moreover, since conditional expectation is a contraction, together with the boundedness of x 1,δ 1 obtained in C.2, we have
where the last term is finite and independent of n. We can apply the dominated convergence theorem (on the measure dπ Δ (δ) ⊗ ds),
Hence we have
By combining (2.18), (2.19), and (2.21), we have
where K is a constant independent of n and N . Since π Δ is an absolutely continuous measure, together with the convergence in (2.21), for any > 0, we can find a sufficiently large n such that sup k≤n p 
Proof. By the Lebesgue decomposition theorem, we can uniquely decompose the measure into π Δ = π 
It should be noted that the absolute continuity assumption on the measure π Δ in section 2. 
where p
and z (n) (t) are defined as in Theorem 2.2. By the definition of π Δ in (2.23), we can find a sufficiently large n such that sup k≤n p (n) k < 2 (see Lemma A.1) and
Similarly, we can choose a sufficiently large N such that the two remaining terms are smaller than .
The treatment of the second term is similar, and since π 1− Δ is a measure on a finite set, we can directly apply the result in Lemma 2.1.
Consider the second case that p
Δ is now a measure on a finite set, we can directly apply the result in Lemma 2.1.
For the last case when p 0+ = 1, p 1− = 0, using the same argument, we could obtain similar estimate as in (2.25), which is of order O( ).
Equilibrium. Assume Δ to be a random variable on [a, b]
with any probability measure π Δ . In section 2.1, we assume that all players adopt their own mean field analogical optimal controls to establish the convergence of y 0 → x 0 and y
1 . Suppose now, without loss of generality, the first player uses an arbitrary control v 1 , while other players still adopt the optimal control u 1 . Using similar arguments as in section 2.1, the following convergence also holds.
Corollary 2.4. Suppose (2.14) is satisfied. Then
On the other hand, we also have the convergence for the cost functionals. is an arbitrary control, and {u i 1 : i ≥ 1} are optimal with respect to the control problem defined by (2.5) and (2.6); then
Similarly,
Proof. With assumption A.3 in (2.7) and an application of the Hölder's inequality, we have
By the boundedness on controls in A.5, similarly we have
Here, K in the last row is a constant that depends on T, L, C, σ 0 , σ 1 , and the L is an arbitrary control. By optimality, we first have
).
By Lemma 2.5, we have the approximations
Linear quadratic case.
The -Nash equilibrium established in section 2 allows us to consider the mean field analogy, x i 1 (t), instead of the empirical interacting dynamics, y i 1 (t). For any probability measure π Δ , without loss of generality, it suffices to consider the ith player with the delay Δ i = δ. We call him the representative agent for the whole population. For simplicity we neglect the index and write x 1 (t) ≡ x i 1 (t). We study a linear quadratic control problem as follows. The state evolutions of the dominating player and the representative agent are, respectively, described by
where the mean field term z(t) is to be defined in Problem 3.2. For simplicity, we assume the coefficient matrices (e.g., A 0 , B 0 ) to be constant. The control for the dominating player, v 0 (t), is F 0 t adapted, while the control for the representative agent, v
T the transpose of any matrix M . Suppose that Q i , R i > 0; i = 0, 1; we consider the following problems. 
where z is the solution given in Problem 3.2.
Observe that the representative agent's decision at time
is not necessarily Brownian. The classical FBSDE solved with the martingale representation theorem (MRT) could not be tackled in the absence of a Brownian filtration. Inspired by the ideas in [19] , we can work on forward-backward stochastic dynamics on a non-Brownian filtration. To motivate our further development, we here provide a brief introduction to backward stochastic dynamics as given in [19] .
In particular, we want to solve for (y t , M y (t)) satisfying a stochastic backward equation on an arbitrary filtration H t , (3.1)
or in differential form,
where g is the generator with suitable regularity assumptions (for example, global Lipschitz and linear growth properties) to guarantee the unique existence of the adapted solution y; ξ is the terminal random variable and M y is an H-martingale. Taking conditional expectation on (3.1) yields
Note that
is clearly an H-martingale and hence the targeted martingale is
Furthermore, if we define V (y) t := t 0 g(y s )ds, then Liang, Lyons, and Qian [19] established the method for solving (3.2) by tackling the fixed point problem of
in contrast to the resolution of classical BSDEs, which requires an application of MRT. Throughout this paper, for any backward equation y, we refer to M y as the martingale defined by its terminal and generator as in (3.3). We first solve the control problem for the representative agent. Lemma 3.4 (control for the representative agent). Problem 3.1 is uniquely solvable and the optimal control is −R
, such that n δ satisfies the backward stochastic dynamics:
Proof. Due to the convexity and coerciveness of the objective functional, we can apply the standard stochastic maximum principle. Consider a perturbation of the optimal control u 
We have the inner product
Taking integration and expectation on both sides, and using (3.4), we obtain 
, where P satisfies the symmetric Riccati equation
and g δ satisfies the backward stochastic dynamics
Clearly, g δ is adapted to F 0 t−δ ∨ F z t , and hence the functional form of the optimal control for the representative agent u
This agrees with the usual Stackelberg setting. By the main result obtained in [19] , we have the unique existence of the backward dynamic equation g δ , which is also adapted to the non-Brownian filtration G δ . Hence, there exists a unique solution to Problem 3.1 that is determined by the system
The unique existence of the following equivalent forward-backward stochastic dynamical formulation follows immediately due to the unique existence of optimal control:
Remark 3.6. In general the forward-backward stochastic dynamics may not possess a unique global solution. We here provide a class of interesting examples with such unique existence.
Remark 3.7. It is possible to include the mean field term (z) in the diffusion coefficient of the dynamics for the representative agent. The adjoint equation under this case remains unchanged as the mean field term is exogenous to the agent.
To obtain the equilibrium in Problem 3.2, we take the expectation conditional on F 0 t−δ ∨ F z t and integrate on δ against π over [a, b] on both sides of (3.5), which yields
where we write m(t) :
The interchange of conditional expectation and differential is valid as (1) the noise from the dominating player W 0 is independent of the W 1 by definition and (2) the mean field term z is independent of any individual noises W 1 after the averaging effect. Here (z, m) are clearly adapted to F 0 t−a , and hence (z, m) are ordinary FBSDE (adapted to the Brownian filtration F 0 ·−a ). Indeed, by MRT, dM m (t) has to be in the form of Z(t)dW (t − a) for some Z(t) ∈ F 0 t−a . Before proceeding to Problem 3.3, we first discuss the existence of (3.6). Lemma 3.8. Given any square integrable process x 0 , suppose that the nonsymmetric Riccati equation
admits a unique solution on [0, T ]; then there uniquely exists a solution to (3.6) . Proof. It is easy to see that if h satisfies the BSDE 
For the sake of reference, a sketch of the proof of this claim is provided in the appendix. More details can be found in [9] . We thus have
Since the above equation admits a unique solution y(t 0 ), we have that the matrix
One can set a well-defined process:
By simply taking differentiation with respect to t, we have
HenceΓ solves the nonsymmetric Riccati equation (3.7) .
In the rest of this paper, we assume that the condition given by Proposition 3.9, which is independent of the choice of x 0 , holds. The unique existence of system (3.6) is then guaranteed. We next turn to the control problem for the dominating player. Note that we can decompose the system into (z 0 , m 0 ) ∈ F 
It can be shown that L is bounded (and hence continuous); see Lemma A.3. By the Riesz representation theorem, the Hermitian adjoint operator
). In particular, we have that the operator norm is preserved, i.e., L = L * . The dynamics and the cost functional for the dominating player can be rewritten as 
where x 0 satisfies (3.10).
Proof. Let u 0 + θũ 0 be the perturbation of the optimal control. The original states x 0 becomes x 0 + θx 0 with
Consider the first order condition,
On the other hand,
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First observe that
Hence, taking integration on [0, T ] and expectation on both sides of (3.12) yields
Using (3.11), we finally conclude that
Sinceũ 0 is arbitrary, we have that the optimal control is −R
where the unique existence of (α, β) is ensured by Lemma 3.8 and Proposition 3.9.
by (3.13) and (3.14) is given by
Proof. Consider the difference of inner product
One can take integration over [0, T ] and expectation on both sides; then we obtain
The second equality comes from the fact that q, r vanish on appropriate domains. Observe that both L(g)(t) and L * (f )(t) are F 0 t adapted. Using the result obtained in Theorem 3.11, by putting
we have the explicit formulation for the adjoint process p in Lemma 3.10. Altogether, the solution is represented by the following six equations:
Remark 3.12. If Δ ≡ 0, which implies a = b = 0, then the above six equations reduce to the results in [3] without terminal terms.
Remark 3.13. The backward equation p is also know as the "anticipated BSDE"; see Peng and Yang [21] for details.
Remark 3.14. If D = 0 and F = 0, the system is degenerated in the sense that the state of the representative agent and his objective functional are independent of those of the dominating player, and then (3.15) reduces to a system of four equations: (z, m) : linear quadratic mean field game problem (see [9] ); (x 0 , p) : standard linear quadratic control problem, given (z, m) (see [2, 11] ).
The adjoints (q, r) could be neglected.
4.
Unique existence for the solution of FBSFDE. It remains to discuss the unique existence for a solution derived in Theorem 3.10, which is represented by an FBSFDE:
For a discussion on the general existence of FBSFDE, see Xu [24] and the references therein. In particular, he extends the method of continuation in the literature of FBSDE. The next theorem concludes this section. Proof. The condition in Proposition 3.9 guarantees the existence of L. In accordance with Theorem 3.1 in Xu [24] , it suffices to check the monotonicity condition. Suppose that (x 0 , p), (x 0 , p ) are two processes on R n1 × R n1 and (x 0 ,p) := (x 0 − x 0 , p − p ). Define the operator 
Consider the inner product
Since R 0 and Q 0 are positive definite, we have
where λ is the smallest eigenvalue for C 0 R −1 0 C T 0 . With this monotonicity condition, the usual method of continuation in FBSDE gives the unique existence result and we omit the proof here.
5.
Conclusion. In summary, the N -player and the mean field system are described, respectively, by Tables 1 and 2 . We show that when all the ith players adopt the optimal control defined by the above mean field dynamics and objectives, and suppose further that the mean field term z satisfies the fixed point property (2.14)
then the N -player system in Table 1 would converge to the mean field analogical system in Table 2 . The mentioned optimal controls serve as an -Nash equilibrium, and their function form is adapted to F 0 t−δ ∨ F z t and hence agrees with the spirit of Stackelberg games. The explicit solution for the linear quadratic setting has also been studied comprehensively. As both Q and C 1 R −1 1 C T 1 > 0, the map x → X corresponds to a well-defined control problem which guarantees the existence of (X, Y ). Thus it suffices to show that it is a contraction, indeed. We first compute the differential for the inner product 
Y (t) + Bx(t), Y (t) − X(t), QX(t) + Sx(t) .
Together with the initial and terminal conditions, we have 
Bx(t), Y (t) − X(t), Sx(t) dt.
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,

